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Berkeley's 'esse is percipi' and Collier's 'simple' argument 
Almost alli who write on Collier note a striking similarity between a short passage in his 
Clavis Universalis and the famous claim that esse is percipi in Berkeley's Principles.  This 
essay explores that similarity in more detail than has been done before.  The comparison 
forces us to address an issue about the nature of passivity in Berkeley's theory of mind.  Two 
interpretations consistent with the text are offered and one is favoured on the grounds that it 
makes some of Berkeley's arguments more plausible.  The idealisms of Berkeley and Collier 
are shown to have a common source. 
 
Introduction 
Arthur Collier was, even in his own time, an obscure Wiltshire clergyman.  He was born in 
1680, educated at Balliol with his younger brother William, and from 1704 until his death in 
1732, was Rector of Langford Magna near Salisbury, a living which had been held by his 
father, grandfather and great grandfather.  William held the living of a neighbouring parish.  
Both brothers were prodigiously interested in metaphysics, and the clerical community to the 
west of Salisbury must have seemed a hotbed of abstract speculation in the first decade of the 
18th century, for Norris held the living of nearby Bemerton. 
 In 1713 Arthur Collier published a slim volume entitled Clavis Universalis which 
argues against the existence of an external world.ii  While stylistically and philosophically 
inferior to Berkeley's works on the subject, the similarities and differences are of interest.  
Collier restricts his attention to the visible world, accepting that it has 'seeming' or 'quasi-
externeity' but, in the first instance, arguing that this is not sufficient reason to believe it 
actually external.  He then proceeds to argue that the visible world cannot be external, not 
pausing to contemplate the apparent consequence that it has an impossible appearance.  In the 
second part of the book, he argues that any external world, even if not perceptible, is 
impossible.  The arguments here draw heavily on Bayle but are presented in a way which 
appears to foreshadow the first two Kantian antinomies. 
 There is no conclusive evidence that Collier had read or even heard of Berkeley 
before the publication of the Clavis.  Shortly afterwards, in a letter to Samuel Clarke on 14th 
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February 1713/4, he refers to 'Mr Berkeley's book' (note the singular) and in 1730 refers to 
the Three Dialogues as 'the only [other] book on that subject, which I ever heard of in the 
world'iii.  If we take him at his word, then, he never read the Principles and only came across 
the Three Dialogues after, and possibly as a consequence of, publishing the Clavis.  
 
Comparing the two arguments 
It is worth quoting the whole of Collier's 'simple' argument for it gives the full flavour of his 
curious style (the spelling and punctuation have been modernized in this passage): 
[To this I might add another, which (if possible) is a yet more simple manner of 
proceeding to the same conclusion.  And it is this.  The objects we speak about are 
supposed to be visible; and that they are visible or seen is supposed to be all that we 
know of them, or their existence.  If so, they exist as visible, or in other words, their 
visibility is their existence.  This therefore destroys all, or any, distinction between 
their Being and their being Seen, by making them both the same thing; and this 
evidently at the same time destroys the externeity of them. But this argument has the 
misfortune of being too simple and evident for the generality of readers, who are apt 
to fancy that light itself is not seen but by the help of darkness; and so, without 
insisting any further on this head, I proceed to some other points which may seem to 
be more intelligible.] (Clavis, pp.36-7) 
The similarity between Collier's identification of Being and being Seen and Berkeley's 
famous 'esse is percipi' is obvious, but the routes that they take to this conclusion initially 
appear very different indeed.  Collier's key premise is an epistemic claim, that what is seen is 
all that we know about visible objects, and the reference to existence seems to embody just 
one aspect of what is so known.  Whereas Berkeley argues from the meaning of the word 
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'exist', that is from a semantic rather than an epistemic position, and with an exclusive focus 
on existence: 
I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this [that the various sensations or 
ideas imprinted on the sense … cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving 
them], by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to 
sensible things.  The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; …  There 
was an odour, that is, it was smelled; there was a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a 
colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch.  This is all that I can 
understand by these and like expressions.  …  Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible 
that they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which 
perceive them. (Principles §3)iv 
Far from appealing to meanings of ordinary words like this, Collier actually thinks that 
ordinary language is committed to exactly what he wants to deny: 
… notwithstanding that there is scarce a word in [the common language] but what 
supposes the Being of an External World, or that the Visible World is External 
(Clavis, p.120). 
Collier goes on to say, in effect, that we should speak with the vulgar and think with the 
learned, and he even uses the same example as Berkeley (Principles §51), of a Copernican 
talking about the sun rising, when he makes that point (though remember that Berkeley only 
holds the common way of speaking to be mistaken about causal relations, not about existence 
and mind-dependence).  In his conclusion, Collier claims that there are some subjects for 
which one must use the language of external existence for to speak otherwise would be 'Vain, 
Nonsensical and Absurd' (Clavis, p.137).  So if Berkeley's argument really is just an appeal to 
ordinary language, he and Collier could not be more different on this point.   
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 However, it is an anachronistic mistake to read the argument of Principles §3 as 
premised on a semantic claim about the word 'exist'.  We find it obvious that any word of our 
language is susceptible to an explicative definition; we expect single language dictionaries to 
have entries for the most common of words, such as 'cat' or the verb 'to be'.  Consequently, 
when Berkeley writes about the 'meaning of exist', we simply assume that he intends to offer 
something akin to a dictionary definition or conceptual analysis, namely non-circular 
necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the application of the word, making explicit the 
implicit knowledge of competent speakers.  But the idea that it makes sense to set about 
doing that for any word of the language can be traced back to Johnson's idiosyncratic 
approach to the task of writing a prescriptive dictionary, and thus to 1755 which succeeds 
Berkeley's death let alone the composition of the Principles.  In the 17th century single-
language English dictionaries were explicitly restricted to 'hard' words, usually derived from 
Latin, Greek or Hebrew, and aimed at 'Ladies, Gentlewomen, or any other unskilfull 
persons'.v  At the beginning of the 18th century, John Kersey was producing dictionaries 
which excluded technical terms and jargon, but also tried to be very extensive (he reached 
38,000 headwords by 1706), but he still restricted himself to 'significant words'.  The first 
serious attempt at recording all English words was Nathaniel Bailey's Universal Etymological 
Dictionary of 1721, but he saw no point in giving definitions as we understand them to the 
words which everyone learns as a small child.  For example, he defines 'cat' and 'horse' as 'a 
creature well known' and 'a beast well known' respectively. 
 If Berkeley's talk of meaning should not be treated as an attempt to fill in the right 
hand side of the analytic philosophers' bi-conditional 'necessarily: x exists if and only if …', 
then how should it be interpreted?  We can take as a starting point the perfectly familiar, 
ordinary sense of 'meaning' in which the meaning of an utterance is the point or purpose of 
making that utterance.  One point of making an assertion is to speak the truth, but we can see 
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that the reasons for a speech act, for making an utterance, often go beyond evidence for its 
truth.  We can, and often do, ask what someone is trying to do by making an assertion, what 
is the point of that assertion (e.g. 'What do you mean by saying that?').  So perhaps Berkeley 
should be read as saying that there is no point or purpose in claiming that something 
perceptible exists other than that it is, or was, or will be perceived.  This would be a natural 
way to read 'trifling with words' in Principles §81: 
yet for anyone to pretend to a notion of entity or existence, abstracted from spirit and 
idea, from perceiving and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright repugnancy and 
trifling with words. 
Trifling actions are meaningless in the sense that they have no point, and speaking nonsense, 
being pointless (comedy aside), would be trifling.  But there are ways of trifling with words 
which are not so obviously nonsensical.  If one asks about the non-trifling uses to which a 
word may be put, one is not interested in linguistic meaning narrowly construed, about what 
we now call the content or truth-conditions of an utterance, but in the practical uses to which 
we can reasonably put our language.  Similarly for Berkeley's claims about the meaning of 
'exist' in Principles §3: he is asking us to reflect upon the point or purpose of saying that a 
sensible thing exists.  As such he is making a substantive modal claim about language, a 
modal claim which one could come to believe in the normal way, that is on the basis of 
reflection and unsuccessfully seeking counterexamples.   
 So saying an assertion such as 'There is a table but no one has ever perceived it or will 
ever perceive it' is meaningless, in the sense now being attributed to Berkeley, is not to say 
that it is empty, or nonsense or analytically false.  Nor is it to say that we could never have 
any evidence for that claim.  These further points may be consequences of idealism, but they 
are not what Berkeley is using as a premise in Principles §3.  Rather, what he wants to say is 
that we could never be in a situation in which there would be any point or purpose in making 
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that assertion (trivial counterexamples like philosophical arguments aside), that any such 
assertion would always be mere trifling with words. And as long as we focus on 'sensible 
things' rather than insensibles such as bacteria and electrons, which are the subject of 
different arguments, the point seems correct.  There is only any point in making assertions 
about such things in so far as they have some effect or impact upon our lives, and the only 
way they can do that is through our perception of them.  Or at least, the only way that they 
can effect us directly is through our perception of them, though they may effect us indirectly 
through their relations to other sensibles which we perceive. Let us grant Berkeley this modal 
claim about purposeful uses of language. We should now ask, how does he get from this 
claim about the meaning or purpose of existence talk to his famous claim about sensible 
things, namely that 'their esse is percipi'?   
Note that his conclusion is not the oft misquoted Latin tag 'esse est percipi': he has not 
simply written the sentence 'to be is to be perceived' in Latin.  Rather he has used a familiar 
technical term in scholastic philosophy, 'esse', which is a noun not an infinitive, meaning 
being or essence.vi  It is striking that he should choose to do this in his published work, where 
he otherwise is careful to avoid the technical terminology of the Schools.  So Principles §3 
has as its conclusion not a claim about the ordinary notion of existence, but one about a 
philosophical notion, namely that the essence or nature of a sensible thing is perceivedness, 
and on the current interpretation, his ground for this is that the only point or purpose of an 
assertion that such a thing exists is to say that it is, or will, or has been perceived by 
someone.vii  That is, if you think hard about why we assert that various sensible things exist, 
you will see that it is only ever to say that there are actually perceived, thus their nature is to 
be perceived, they possess perceivedness essentially, their esse is percipi.  Unfortunately this 
argument is terrible, for even if a sensible thing were only contingently perceived, it could 
still be that the whole of our interest in it was exhausted by our perception of it.  Even if 
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Berkeley is correct that as far as we are concerned it exists if and only if is it perceived, he 
cannot conclude that necessarily it exists if and only if it is perceived.  Berkeley seems to 
have moved illegitimately from how things are for us to how they are in themselves. 
 Interestingly, Collier makes a very similar move in his 'Simple' argument, going from 
how things are for us to how they are in themselves: 
… that they are visible or seen is supposed to be all that we know of them, or their 
existence.  If so, they exist as visible, or in other words, their visibility is their 
existence. (ibid.) 
His premise is that the extent of our knowledge of visible things, and in particular the extent 
of our knowledge of their existence, is what we see of them, from which he concludes that 
their existence consists in their being seen: they only exist for us as visible so they only exist 
as visible.  The fallacy is obvious.  However, we should not be happy with merely noting the 
existence of this bad inference in both Berkeley and Collier, rather we should ask ourselves 
what could these two idealists have been thinking which made this seem a good inference. 
 
The Transparency Thesis 
One clue comes in a letter written by Collier on March 8th 1713/4: 
He [i.e. a certain Mr Balch who had criticised Collier] cannot show another in the 
world, besides Mr Berkeley and myself, who hold the testimony of sense to be 
infallible as to this point [i.e. the existence of visible objects].viii 
Given the prevalence at the time of the view that Berkeley was denying the existence of the 
ordinary objects we take ourselves to perceive, this is very striking: Collier was clearly an 
early sympathetic reader of Berkeley.  Of course, we are interested at the present juncture in 
the alleged infallibility of perception with respect to not just the existence but also the nature 
of sensible things, for we want to know why both Berkeley and Collier are prepared to infer 
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from how things must be for us to how they must be in themselves.  But we can expect the 
two to have a common source.  Let us call the wider infallibility of not only the existence but 
also the nature of the objects of sense the 'transparency thesis'.  Berkeley asserts the full-
blown transparency thesis later on in the Principles: 
Colour, figure, motion, extension and the like … are perfectly known, there being 
nothing in them which is not perceived. (Principles §87) 
A thesis such as this is clearly strong enough to get from Berkeley's and Collier's respective 
premises about how perceptible objects are for us to their conclusions about the nature of 
those objects.  But finding a premise strong enough to reach one's conclusion is easy; it is 
justifying it which is hard.  So what reasons can we find in Berkeley and Collier for 
transparency? 
There is a common interpretation of the opening sections of the Principles which 
holds that Berkeley simply helps himself to this by sleight of hand: he stipulates that the 
objects of perception are 'ideas' and then appeals to a contemporary philosophical theory of 
ideas, as special mental objects, to support the transparency thesis.  This interpretation is 
supported by the phrase omitted from Principles §87 above: 'considered only as so many 
sensations in the mind'.  If this interpretation were right, it would make Berkeley a much less 
interesting philosopher, not least of all because it seems that he may have misunderstood the 
theory of ideas, at least as it appears in Locke.  But it certainly does have the virtue of 
explaining why he accepts transparency with no argument or discussion. 
 Collier cannot be accused of relying on a philosophical theory of ideas in the same 
way, because he does not use the language of ideas or sensations at all, preferring instead 
'visible objects', 'things seen' and occasionally 'bodies'.  He does at one point argue, like 
Berkeley, that if one accepts the mind-dependence of secondary qualities, then one must also 
accept the mind-dependence of all perceived qualities (Clavis, pp.20-2), but he does not ever 
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use the term 'idea' and nor does he rest much weight on this particular argument.  Rather than 
relying on a pre-existing theory of ideas, he offers something a bit closer to an argument for 
transparency, at least with respect to the existence of visible objects: 
For is there any other possible Way of seeing a Thing than by having such or such a 
Thing present to our Minds? … Then may we think, without thinking on any Thing; 
or perceive, without having any Thing in our Mind.  (Clavis, p.36) 
This is a version of an argument we find in Plato (Theaetetus, 188e) and Malebranche: 
I am thinking of a variety of things: of a number, of a circle, of a house, of such and 
such beings, of being.  Thus, all these things exist, at least while I think of them. … 
For if the circle I perceived were nothing, in thinking of it I would be thinking of 
nothing.  (Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, I, iv)ix 
It is clear that Malebranche takes thinking about something as being related to it in a certain 
way and Collier both extends this to perception and specifies the relation as being 'present to 
the mind'.  These two moves allow him to conclude that visible objects 'cannot possibly be 
External to, at a Distance from, or Independent on, us' (Clavis, p.36).  What is interesting 
about the argument in Malebranche and Collier is that it does not rest upon a theory of the 
nature of the objects of perception, but upon a claim about the relation we stand in to things 
we think about or perceive. 
So it is important to distinguish two very different reasons for accepting transparency.  
One would be that the objects of knowledge or perception are such as to prevent error, that 
they are the kind of thing which is as it seems and seems as it is: they are mental objects or 
sensations, along the lines of a common understanding of pains.  The other would be that the 
relation we hold to these objects is such that nothing is hidden.  For Collier it is clearly the 
latter, but what about Berkeley?  To answer that question, we need to know a great deal more 
about how Berkeley conceived the perceptual relation. 
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'Passive Reception' 
Berkeley tells us that perceived ideas exist 'in the mind' but not 'by way of mode or accident'.  
Rather they exist in the mind as objects of perception.  The main thing he tells us about 
perception is that it is passive.  And interestingly he uses this, rather than the Humean 'double 
existence' move, to argue against an act-object account of perception in the First Dialogue 
(Dialogues, pp.196-7). His objection to an act-object account is that it requires the active 
involvement of the mind, where active is taken to mean voluntary, in what he regards as a 
purely passive process.  But it has seemed to many that this argument can be neatly side-
stepped, that we can keep the distinction integral to the act-object account between the mental 
event of perceiving and the object perceived, by allowing the mental event to be involuntary, 
to be passive, to be something that happens to us not something we do.  In order to maintain 
his objection to the act-object account, it Berkeley would have to claim that all mental events 
or occurrences are voluntary acts of that mind, that there can be no mental act in perception 
which is not a voluntary action by the perceiver.  But if that were the case, no other thing, not 
even God, could cause one of our mental events, since all our mental events would be under 
our voluntary control.  God could not cause someone to think about Berkeley or to imagine a 
tree: God's actions could at best be an occasion for our volitions which then cause those 
mental events. 
 Now Berkeley does take all God's mental events to be voluntary actions, concluding 
that He does not perceive by sense at all: 
But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we 
do, whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be 
thwarted or resisted by nothing; it is evident, such a being as this can suffer nothing, 
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nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. (Dialogues 
p.241, my emphasis) 
Thus, in order to distinguish us creatures from God, and to allow that we can have sense 
perception, Berkeley must allow that there is something passive in our minds.  Which is 
exactly what he does in the correspondence with Johnson.  Johnson writes: 
There is certainly something passive in our souls, we are purely passive in the 
reception of our ideas; (5th February 1730)x 
and Berkeley responds: 
That the soul of man is passive as well as active I make no doubt. (24th March 1730)xi 
It seems to follow that there are two sorts of occurrence in our minds, passive perceivings and 
active willings, and thus the mind has both an active part and a passive part.  But the matter is 
not as simple as it seems, for Berkeley does not allow that we have two faculties, an active 
will and a passive sense-perception, for he is clear that the mind is both active and undivided: 
A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being: as it perceives ideas, it is called the 
understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the 
will. (Principles §27) 
So God's essential activity rules out his having sense-perceptions, which are essentially 
passive,xii whereas our more humble, finite active nature leaves us somehow able to receive 
ideas passively.  Perhaps our passive reception of ideas consists in a restriction or limitation 
upon our power to choose which ideas we perceive.  However, the passive event of 
perceiving those ideas would still create a problem for Berkeley's theory of mind.  To see 
this, suppose that Berkeley is thinking of activity along the lines of a Cartesian essential 
attribute of all minds, both Divine and created.  Then every mental state, event or occurrence 
is a mode of that mind's activity, which seems to rule out human perception just as much as 
divine perception, for a passive perception is not a mode of activity.   
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Thus there is a prima facie problem in Berkeley's theory of mind.  The mind is simple, 
undivided and essentially active, and yet created minds are passive in their reception of ideas.  
The problem is exceptionally clear in Principles §139 where we are told that 'a soul or spirit 
is an active being, whose existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas 
and thinking.' 
In the unfortunate absence of Part 2 of the Principles, we must speculate on how this 
problem could be resolved, and I can think of two proposals.  
 
(1) Perhaps Berkeley is not using 'active' and 'passive' as contraries, perhaps he thinks that, in 
sense perception, the mind is both passive, because not in control, and actively receptive.  
This would reconcile indivisibility of the mind with the appearance of separate active and 
passive faculties and also explain why he includes perception of ideas by the understanding 
as an activity in Principles §27 while treating it elsewhere as passive.  It would also make 
linguistic sense if he was using 'passive' as the contrary not of 'active' but of 'impassive', a 
term he reserves to describe God's inability to be affected with sensations.  Thus our passivity 
would sometimes consist in our being the patient in an interaction, whereas God is always the 
agent, but being a patient can itself be an activity. 
However, at Principles §27, Dialogues pp.213, 217 and 231 ideas are described as 
'passive and inert' and at Principles §69 the same phrase is used to describe matter, in both 
cases trying to draw a contrast with the active nature of (finite) minds, which contrast 
requires active and passive to be contraries.  Of course, this only shows that 'passive' is the 
contrary of 'active' if Berkeley's use is univocal, and one might think that the conjunction 
'passive and inert' signals a particular use of the term.  However, there are also uses of 
'passive' to mean inactive which do not have the qualification 'and inert' at Principles §§70 
and 141.  What would be needed to establish the charge of equivocation would be uses of 
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'passive' which can be read as 'being a patient' but not as 'inert'.  The only two candidates in 
the early works are Principles §139: 
I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree, in that they are intirely passive, 
and their existence consists only in being perceived: whereas a soul or spirit is an 
active being, whose existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas 
and thinking 
and Dialogues p.217 (from the mouth of Hylas): 
And indeed it is very plain, that when I stir my finger, it remains passive; but my will 
which produced the motion, is active. 
But neither forces that reading, so the textual evidence is inconclusive on the point. 
 
(2) Berkeley may have made a general distinction between the active understanding, which is 
the faculty of judgement, knowledge and reason and can be identified with the mind, and the 
purely passive business of sense-perception.  Thus, when he writes in Principles §27 of the 
perception of ideas by the understanding, he should not be taken to include sense-perceptions.  
This would amount to a denial of the receptivity of perception, for if all mental occurrences 
or events are active, and sense-perception is not, then it does not involve any mental event 
(though it may be accompanied by one).  He certainly made a sharp distinction between 
understanding and sense perception in the Theory of Vision Vindicated (1733): 
To perceive is one thing; to judge is another. So likewise, to be suggested is one thing, 
and to be inferred another. Things are suggested and perceived by sense. We make 
judgments and inferences by the understanding. (§42) 
And even later in Siris (1744): 
As understanding perceiveth not, that is, doth not hear, or see, or feel, so sense 
knoweth not: and although the mind may use both sense and fancy, as means whereby 
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to arrive at knowledge, yet sense, or soul so far forth as sensitive, knoweth nothing.  
For, as it is rightly observed in the Theaetetus of Plato, science consists not in the 
passive perceptions, but in the reasoning upon them.  (§305) 
Unfortunately, there is no such clear statement in the earlier works, but nor is there anything 
inconsistent with this interpretation.  This omission might be explained by the fact that at the 
time he wrote the Principles and Dialogues he still intended to publish Part 2 of the 
Principles, which was to have dealt explicitly with these matters.  Furthermore, we should 
note that in both these later works Berkeley writes as if he is stating the obvious, as if he 
expects the reader to concur without argument.  And if he did take this distinction to be 
obvious, then the emphasis on the passivity of perception, coupled with the essential activity 
of mind, would amount to a denial of receptivity: the passive reception of ideas is not a 
reception at all, for the perceiving mind contributes nothing to the occurrence of a perceiving. 
 
 We have then two incompatible interpretations of Berkeley's conception of sense 
perception and no textual evidence which will decide conclusively between them.  What is 
undeniable is that Berkeley took sense perception to be passive.  Either he reconciled this 
with the essential activity of the mind by saying that it also involved an involuntary but active 
receptivity, or by denying that sense perception itself involved any event or occurrence of 
receptivity on the part of the perceiving mind.  However, Berkeley's inexplicit, unquestioning 
reliance on the transparency thesis in the crucial argument of Principles §3 gives us an 
indirect reason for favouring the latter interpretation.  For it is thinking of perception as 
having a structure involving an event of receptivity on the part of the subject which makes 
the transparency thesis so implausible.  In fact, we may make an even stronger claim: only 
the second interpretation provides a charitable explanation of Berkeley's unquestioning 
commitment to the transparency of perception. 
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Conclusion  
Once we have interpreted Berkeley as accepting transparency by denying receptivity, we can 
see that the striking similarity between his esse is percipi and Collier's simple argument is far 
from superficial.  Both arguments rely upon the transparency thesis, and furthermore, both 
authors accept transparency because they think it follows from the nature of the relation of 
perception, and not because they think it follows from the nature of the objects of perception, 
that is, not because they think the objects of perception are mental and therefore known 
through and through.  This is obvious in Collier but obscured in Berkeley by his decision to 
use 'idea' to describe the objects of perception.  But careful attention to Berkeley's opinion 
that perception is passive reveals that he thinks that to perceive is just to have some thing 
before the mind, that perceived objects are available for reason and judgement, but that their 
being perceived does not itself involve any mental act.  This combination of views, which we 
might provocatively call 'Pre-Kantian Innocence', explains Berkeley's uncritical acceptance 
of transparency.  And only if transparency derives in this way from a conception of the 
perceptual relation, rather than of the objects of perception, can it be used as a non-question-
begging assumption in an argument for the conclusion that those objects of perception are 
mind-dependent.  And that is precisely what both Berkeley and Collier are concerned to do.xiii 
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i For example, in the 20th century we find the comparison in such different writers as 
Bowman, E. (ed), Clavis Universalis, Chicago, Open Court, 1909; Johnston, G. The 
Development of Berkeley's Philosophy, London, Macmillan, 1923, p.380; Muirhead, J., The 
Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1931, 
p.111; McCracken, C. and Tipton, I., Berkeley's Principles and Dialogues: Background 
Source Materials, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.149.  Unsurprisingly, the 
comparison tends not to be made when the author is writing about the relation between 
Collier and Malebranche, e.g. McCracken, C., Malebranche and British Philosophy, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1983, pp.194-5, or between Collier and Kant, e.g. Brykman, G., 'Kant, 
Berkeley, et la «Méthode Sceptique»', Kant et la Pensée Moderne: Alternatives Critiques, 
Bordeaux, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 1996, pp.131-3. 
ii The title-page reads in full:  
Clavis Universalis: or, A New Inquiry after Truth.  Being a Demonstration of the 
Non-Existence, or Impossibility, of an External World. By Arth. Collier, Rector of 
Langford Magna, near Sarum.  Printed for Robert Gosling, at the Mitre and Crown 
against St. Dunstan's Church in Fleetstreet. 1713.   
All pages references are to the original edition. 
iii A Specimen of True Philosophy, Salisbury, Charles Hooton, 1730, reprinted in Parr, S., 
Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century, London, Edward 
Lumley, 1837, p.114. 
iv References to Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, Theory of Vision Vindicated and 
Siris are by section number, and to the Three Dialogues are by page number in the edition of 
Jessop, T. and Luce, A., The Works of George Berkeley, Volume 2, London, Thomas Nelson, 
1949. 
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v Robert Cawdrey, A Table Alphabeticall, J. Roberts for E. Weaver, 1604, from the 
frontispiece. 
vi It is quite clear that this is how Johnson reads Berkeley, since Johnson uses 'esse' as a noun, 
asking Berkeley about the 'esse of spirits'.  I know of no place where Berkeley wrote the 
Latin sentence 'esse est percipi', and a search of the electronic version of Jessop and Luce 
confirms this.  Yet even Luce himself makes the mistake (Berkeley's Immaterialism, London: 
Thomas Nelson, 1945, p.58).  In Notebook A 429, which is the earliest occurrence of the 
principle using Latin terms (cf. 408), he does not use 'est', but nor does he use 'esse', writing 
instead 'Existence is percipi or …'.  This adds weight to the claim that his use of 'esse' in 
Principles §3 is a deliberate and calculated allusion to scholastic conceptions of essence.  
Collier is more than happy to use 'esse' in its scholastic sense in his A Specimen of True 
Philosophy, and even quotes Aquinas: 'Accidentis esse est inesse' (p. 117).   
vii In 'Berkeley and the Meaning of Existence', History of European Ideas, 7, 1986, pp.567-
73, Michael Ayers gives a rather different account of how Berkeley manages to relate claims 
about existence and essence.  Ayers' interpretation is based entirely on the development of 
Berkeley's thinking revealed in the notebooks, rather than the final version of his views 
which he chose to publish. 
viii Benson, R., Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Rev. Arthur Collier, M.A.  London, 
Edward Lumley, 1837, p.32. 
ix Malebranche, N., Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, ed. N. Jolley and trans. D. Scott, 
Cambridge, CUP, 1997. 
x Jessop, T. and Luce, A., The Works of George Berkeley, Volume 2, London, Thomas 
Nelson, 1949, p.289. Johnson states his view more fully in his Elementa Philosophica 
(1752): 
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In the perception of these ideas or objects of sense, we find our minds are merely 
passive, it not being in our power (supposing our organs rightly disposed and situated) 
whether we will see light and colours, hear sounds, &c.  We are not causes to 
ourselves of these perceptions, nor can they be produced in our minds without a 
cause, or (which is the same thing) by any imagined unintelligent, inert, or unactive 
cause (which indeed is a contradiction in terms), from whence it is a demonstration 
that they must derive to us from an almighty, intelligent active cause, exhibiting them 
to us, impressing our minds with them, or producing them in us.  And consequently 
(as I intimated), it must be by a perpetual intercourse of our minds with the Deity, the 
great Author of our beings, or by His perpetual influence or activity upon them, that 
they are possessed of all these objects of sense and the light by which we perceive 
them.  (I, i, 7) 
Johnson here shows a callous indifference to the important distinctions between ideas being 
exhibited to us, impressed upon us and produced in us. 
xi ibid., p.293 
xii There are some very clear statements of this in Notebook B (Jessop, T. and Luce, A., The 
Works of George Berkeley, Volume 1, London, Thomas Nelson, 1948): 
Whatsoever has any of our ideas in it must perceive, it being that very having, that 
passive reception of ideas that denominates the mind perceiving. that being the very 
essence of perception, or that wherein perception consists. (301) 
10 the bare passive reception or having of ideas is call'd perception  
11 Whatever has in it an idea, tho it be never so passive, tho it exert no manner of 
act about it, yet it must perceive. 10  (378) 
xiii Versions of this paper have been read, and improved by subsequent discussions, at the 
International Berkeley Conference in Estonia, the York Staff Research Seminar, the Warwick 
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Philosophy Colloquium and the Oxford Early Modern Philosophy Seminar.  Travel to 
Estonia was supported by a British Academy Overseas Conference Grant. 
